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Since almost every imaginable attribute has at one time or other been 
ascribed to the Germans, this stereotype dissolves on closer inspection into 
a kaleidoscope of images, shaped by competing influences and groups. As long 
as there is no explicit crtsis the media tend to be oblivious to continental 
news. The daily and periodical press features West Ge'.rmany cnly occasionally 
as emerging leader of European opinion, as economic competitor, as military 
ally or as harbor of Nee-Nazism. In Hollywood, Germans, function as Ers-2-tz-
Indians, with the blond-beast SS officer as villain, the common soldier as buf:.. 
foon or the Junker as symbol of decadence. In high-school and college text-
books, Prussian militarism appears more often as source of the world wars than. 
Old Germany does as homeland for about one-fifth of the American population. 
From the wrn of th.e centur,Y on British intellectuals, as experts on the German 
danger, have set a critical cultural tone for many of their American counterparts. 
Lest we forget, the Jewish community is mounting a sustained effort to commemorate 
· the holocaust not only for religious reasons but also for the political purpose 
of rallying support for the survival of Israel. The few remaining German-
American associations cultivate a nostalgic Dirndl and Lederhosen remembrance 
of the Old Country in folksy singing and dancing clubs. Finally the diplomatic 1 
business.and academic representatives of the Federal Republic are trying to 
improve public. attitudes through an active information policy of the German 
Information Center, a handful of Goethe _houses and several exchange programs. 
Since current ambivalences.towards the Germans represent successive layers of 
earlier cliches, it is necessary to ask: . How did the German image evolve? 
Three major waves of immigrants from Central Europe created the basic~ 
recurrent and largely positive impression. The thirteen Mennonite families 
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Few peoples have provoked such scorn or pr'aise, such fears or hopes as the 
Germans. While England evokes the Queen, France calls up Paris, Italy means 
the Pope, Germany conjurs up the Berlin Wall, the Third Reich or the World 
Wars. Some also associate it with beer, quaint_towns, romantic landscapes 
or industrial technology. Opinions are fundamentally ambivalent. According 
to a 1966 German government survey 13% of Americans were very friendly~ 67% 
moderately friendly, 12% quite unfriendly and 8% undecided towards the Germans. 
Con sci enti ousness, res pons i bil, i ty, thoroughness, industriousness, energy, 
creativity, orderliness and stubborness make them attractive as immigrants, 
neighbors, fellow workers or even as daughters-in-law. But rudeness, heaviness, 
· brutality, national ism, mi 1 itari sm, material ism, formal ism, servi 1 i ty, immodera-
tion, loudness, .. or tact.lessness render them less sympathetic than the British 
(but more so than the Italians or French). Since college students consider 
Germans "difficult, aggressive, masculine, unromantic, uncultured but professionally 
useful,'' the language itself reinforces the confusion of technological-scientific· 
admiration and cultural-political distrust. Though often mutually exclusive, 
these widespread attitudes have coalesced into the notion of a contradictory 
national character which is supposed to hold .the key to the perennial 11 German 
problem." As the British historian A. J. P. Taylor said in 1946 with brilliant 
tendentiousness: "'German' has meant at one moment a being so sentimental, 
so trusting, so pious, as to be too good for this world; and at another a 
being so brutal, so unprincipled, so degraded~ as to be not fit to live. Both 
descriptions are true: both types of Germans have existed not only at the same 
· epoch, but in the same person. Only the normal person, not particularly good, 




who arrived on the 11 Concord 11 at Philadelphia in 1683 began a South:..West German 
peasant-migration for land and religious freedom which established the Pennsyl-
- vania Dutch (the term is a deterioration of Deutsch) as farmers all over the 
Middle-Atlantic colonies. Admired by Benjamin Franklin for their "habitual 
industry and thrift,11 the rural newcomers appeared sturdy, coarse and quiet and 
•kept to themselves. In contrast to these somewhat drab "greys, 11 the thousands 
of colorful "greens" which fled after the failure of the 1848 revolution showed 
- ' 
a more political, educated and active spirit. Led by the dynamic Senator 
and Secretary of Interior Carl Schurz, these Forty-Eighters established many 
cultural institutions such as churches, German-newspapers and colleges, and 
campaigned for the Republican party, congenial to their own liberalism, with 
the slogan "liberty and lagerbeer. 11 The hundreds of thousands of rural and 
increasingly also urban poor from North•West Germany,which streamed across the 
Atlantic in the second half of the century, settled predominantly in Mid-
Western cities such as Cincinnati~ Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Louis, known not 
only for ·their bre_weries but also .for their symphony orchestras. This third 
group excelled in mechanical industry and created hundreds of voluntary 
associations from Turner (gymnasts) via the Liederkranz (glee clubs) to the 
SchUtzenverein (shooting society) Which celebrated their holidays such as 
Chr.istmas or Easter (tree and bunny are German imports) with streams of beer, 
mounds of cake and coffee (Kaffeklatsch) and processions of oompah bands 
much to the chagrin of their puritanical or baptist neighbors .. They were 
known as folksy (gemUtlich), adept ·at music, deeply religious (Dunckers, 
Amish, Missouri Synod ot' the Lutherans), and, as before, as honest, hardworking, 
politically reliab~e, peaceful and largely passive. According to a study by 
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Norbert Muhlen, the most frequent adjectivesused by the English press to 
describe them were '1calm, moderate, hardy, staid, brave, kindly, qu'iet, 
domestic." As middle and lower class they were patronized by the WASPS, 
. 
mocked by the volatile Irish and'resented for their economic success and 
rise to respectability by Slavic and Italian late-comers. From Johan Jacob 
, , 
Astor to Frederic Weyerhaeuser, from John D. Rockefeller to George Wi;sting-
house, from Walter Chrysler to Henry Clay Frick, from Steinway Sons to 
Warburg and Company, from Al~mann's to Anhaeuser-Busch, there is hardly an· 
:area of American business in which German craftsmen, inventors, merchants and 
brokers have not left their mark. 
' For educated Americans, Germany meant something entirely different, a 
country both romantic and scholarly, symbolized by the dual meaning of Old 
Heidelberg. James Fenimore Cooper set volume two of his European Trilogy 
(1831-33) in,_ the South-Western Palatinate of the 16th century, while Washington 
Irving loved German fairy-tales and legends, reflected in "Rip van Winkle" 
(1819). Similarly in Hyperion (1839) Henry Wadsworth Longfellow invented an 
American Werther with a happier ending while Louisa May Alcott in her Little 
Women (1868/9) created professor Friedrich .Shaer as a kindly symbol of German 
learning. Reflecting the sympathies of these li~erati, The Nation in 1866 
described the Germans as "the most learned, patient, industrious, civilized 
people on the face of the globe, which has attained the highest dittinction in 
arts, in science, in arms,_ in literature, in everything, in short, but in 
politics." ~~hen literary infatuation with the- land of the thinkers and poets, 
of castles and romances waned, scholarly interest and influence took its place. 
In 1815 the Harvard theologian Edward Everett, the Germanicist George TiGknor, 
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the philologist George Bancroft and the generalist Joseph Green Cogswell went 
to Goettingen, and started a stream of American students which reached about 
10,000 by the end of the century. 11 1 think the Germans have an integrity of 
mind which sets their science above all other, 11 Ralph Waldo Emerson judged. 
Attractive as the home of academic freedom, as the leader of scientific 
advancement, and as the place for unfettered student life (which was immortal-
ized by Sigmund Romberg's Student Prince in the l920's), Germany appeared, 
even to critical observers, as embodiment of academic ideals. The conception 
of the university's "chief task [as] the development of great thinkers, men 
who will extend the boundaries of knowledge" inspired the establish~ent of 
graduate education (The Johns Hopkins University, 1876), of scholarly associ-
ations (The American Historical Association in 1884) and the professionaliza-
tion of academic occupations (W. Flexner's report on medical training) in the 
United States. In the 1 ast pre-war years most U. S. academics -agreed with the 
Educational Review: "German universities constitute a principal bulwark of ideal 
culture_in our age. 11 
By 1900 political rivalry began to tarnish this shining image. Because of 
Gel_"man fragmentation and American westward expansion, there had been little 
diplomatic contact and less conflict between the Holy Roman Empire or the 
German Confederation and the nascent union of the United States. Enthusiasti-
cally welcomed as struggle for democracy, the 1848 revolution, in which the 
Germans according to Julia Ward Howe "had dreamed of freedom, but had not 
dreamed of the way to secure it, 11 disappointed many who after its failure be-
lieved with the New York Herald that Germans..-lacked political ability and were 
incapable of e;t1~lishing republican institutions." During the Danish struggle 
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of 1864 and the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, American sympathies were with 
Protestant Prussia, with which, according to the New York Tribune 11 is bound up 
so much of hope, progress and the possibility of freedom and national growth. 11 
Similarly in the Franco-Prussian conflict, the French Emperor Napoleon III, 
discredited by his Mexican adventure with Maximilian I in the 1860is was 
denounced in the press as 11murderer, 11 11 perjurer, 11 11 traitor 11 and 11 the most 
dangerous malefactor who ever us·urped supreme power. 11 But the victory at 
Sedan, the achievement of German unification and the proclamation of a Kaiser 
on January 18, 1871, in contras:t to the founding of the Third Republic pro-
duced a marvelous reversal of feelings for the new, democratic France. Walt 
Whitman noted: 11 As the case stands, I find myself now far more for the.French 
than I ever was for the Prussians." While scholarly admiration and popular 
kinship continued, Anglo-Saxon empathy for 11 a people striving for national 
unification and self-government11 was clouded by fears of domestic autocracy 
·and foreign expansionism. This loss of political innocence was aggravated by 
the clash of German aspirations for Weltpolitik with American hopes for 11 open 
door11 imperialism in Latin America (Venezuela) and the Pacific (Samoa, Manila 
Bay) around-the turn of the century. In contrast to Prince Bismarck's mastery 
of diplomacy, the verbal bellicosity and fickleness of William II created the 
caricature of"the "fearful and funny 11 Kaiser Bill twirling his turned-up 
mustache and rattling his sabre. New adjectives appeared to describe the 
Germans -- 11 arrogant, 11 11 power-mad, 11 11militaristic and imperialistic, 11 11 fond of 
·vainglory and conquest, 11 because they dared covet some of the same prizes as 
Teddy Roosevelt. In belated,imitation of British warnings (Spectator: Germaniam 
esse delendam) about trade rivalry and naval race, a spate of Germanophobe books, 
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such as the diatribe by the Washington University historian Roland G. Usher 
against Pan-Germanism (1913), appeared in the last pre-war years. The quiet 
Germans were bec~ming restless, with opinion hanging in the balance~ 
World War One (1914-1918) destroyed the remnants of friendly stereotypes 
and exaggerated the new, often hostile image of Germany. By playing on 
William IIs intemperate exhortation to the expeditionary corps dispatched 
against the Chinese Boxer Rebellion ("Be as terrible as Attila's Huns 11 ), 
Allied propaganda, picking up a theme first sounded by the New York Times in 
1871 , made the enemy synonymous with the 'Huns. 1 German-American citizens, 
' once regarded with respect and sympathy, now became suspect as un-American 
· hyphenates. The reasons for this· unprecedented animosity were manifold. Be-
cause of the royal navy's mastery of the seas and Reuter 1 s hold on the transat-
lantic telegraph cables, the Entente countries of England, France, Russia, 
Serbia and Japan controlled the entire flow of information from the embattled 
! ' 
continent. The blunders of the Central Powers of Germany, Austria and Turkey, 
such as the violation of Belgian neutrality (Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg 1 s 
ill-fated 'scrap of paper 1 phrase), the clumsy espionage and sabotage attempts 
(for which a certain captain Franz von Papen was expelled from the U.S~), the 
interception and publication of the und.iplomatic Zimmerman telegram (proposing 
a Mexican-German alliance) and finally the dramatic U-boat sinkings of luxury 
· liners such as the Lusitania with the loss of much. life (in contrast to mere 
spoilage of property in the British blockade) helped British press-lord 
Northcliffe's agitation against Germany. But equally important was the reversal 
of public opinion in the United States. The fa.stern elite (for the sake of cul-
tural affinity), the business community (to safeguard their Entente investments) 
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and the Republican Party (out of imperialism) favored intervention. The Pro-
gressive.s and large numbers of Democrats espoused neutrality and a considerable 
proportion of German-Americans (for obvious reasons), Central European Jews 
(out of anti-Tsarist resentment), and Irish politicians (thanks to animosity 
against the United Kingdom) supported the Central Powers. When President Wilson 
moralistically decided to extend the definition of neutral rights on the high seas 
to include travllling on belligerent ships, he had tb pun the masses along who 
I 
re-elected him tn 1916 because he had kept them out of the war. The government 
sponsored "Comm,ttee on Public Information," dire_cted by the journalist George 
Creel, coordinated an unparalleled campaign of invective from the white book on 
How the War Came to America (1917) all the way to lurid leaflets depicting ex-
plosive puppets dropped behind the lines so that innocent little French girls 
would have their hands torn off. Using the Prussian historian Heinrich van 
Treitschke, the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and the progressive politician 
Friedrich Naumann as ammunition, intellectuals like the University of Missouri 
sociologist Thorstein Veblen as well as writers like the Frenchman Andre Cheradame 
volunteered for the propaganda effort. German language teaching was forbidden, 
Sauerkraut was renamed victory cabbage, and German Jews were maligned in an orgy 
of hate, characterized by J. G. Gazley: "It was popularly believed that every 
Frenchman was naturally and inherently a hero, and every German instinctively 
-and una l terab 1 y a baby-ki 11 er . 11 
Between the dark and threatening clouds of the little and big world wars, 
the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) appeared as a promising ray of hope. "In 
innocence," Henry Cord Meyer recalled "we evidently presumed that with militarism 
defeated and the Kaiser gone the Germans would build a good middle-class republic 
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not unlike our own." Hum~nitarian Herbert Hoover's post-war food relief, American 
business (Charles G. Dawes) mediation in the contentious reparation problem, 
Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann 1 s fulfillment policy towards the dictate 
of Versailles (such as his adherence to the Locarno treaties, stabilizing Western 
fro.nti ers), and the radiation of Weimar cultural modernism such as Bert Brecht or 
the 3auhaus, restored some of the earlier favorable opinions about Germany. While 
there was much sentimental interest in the fall of the Second Empire (evident in 
the numerous English translations of memoirs of defeated generals like Ludendorff, 
deposed royaltylike William II or retired diplomats like Count Bernstorff), the 
propaganda~overkill of the war led to a revisionist examination of the German 
guilt for the outbreak of the First World War. In works such as The Origins 
of the World War (1928), scholars like S. B. Fay and H. E .. Barnes placed more 
responsibility on Serbia for the assassination of Arch cuke Francis Ferdinand, 
on Russia for general mobilization, on France for revanchism and on Britain 
for the naval rivalry. The Ruhr occupation of president Poincare' (1923) made 
the French appear as the primary threat to peace, while democratic Germany was 
now the underdog, profiting from the natural Anglo-American sympathy for "our German 
counsins II to ,quote John Mander. Accardi ng to one E. Luehr, "through the bl is-
tering blasts of Bolshevism, through the degradation of treaty and reparations, 
through the ferocity of Fascism, German democrats stood as the stm ngest bul-
war.k of free representative government on the European continent." Unfortunately 
the shattering political impact of the unemployment and business failures of 
the Great Depression (1929) betied such words as soon as they were written. Some 
perceptive observers like Paul Kosak began to warn of the dis.integration of 
Weimar constitutionalism, of popular resentment against German robber barons 
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and against the r1gidity of class structure 11 which was effectively perpetuated · 
by school and civic education. 11 But the decline of interest in foreign affairs 
and exaggerated confidence in the inevitable triumph of republican government 
meant that Americans were quite unprepared for the advent of National Socialism 
in 1933. When the rude awakening came, journalists like Edgar Ahsel Mowrer 
naturally reverted to old cliches and argued that Germany Puts.the Clock Back 
(March, 1933). 
Although the Third Reich (1933-1945) aroused much curiosity, Anglo-American 
confusion only slowly gave way to unanimous condemnation. Impressed by the order 
and dynamism of the 11 New Germany" during the Berlin Olympic Games of 1936, many 
Americans agreed that -"you can do business with [Adolf] Hitler" and refused to 
. heed the warnings of Jewish or political refugees against Nazi persecution. 
Though apalled by the enthusiasm of the German-American Bun-: for t:ic Fu·~'.'lrer, U.S. 
papers were divided on the wisdom of 'interfering' in Europe again and only 
strongly ·internationalist sheets 1 ike the St. Louis Post-Dispatch came out 
against the Third Reich while isolationist organs like the St. Louis Globe 
Democrat tried to remain neutral. But the brown purge of the bureaucracy in 
1933, the 1935 Nuremberg raeial laws, the Kristallnacht poflror., in 1938 and 
spread of concentration camps aroused the enmity of the U.S. Jewish community. 
When prominent Weimar Republicans like the last regular Chancellor Heinrich 
Br'!lning were forced to flee, their cause was quickly taken up by the American 
Left, "a very literate and vocal unit of the public, 11 which denounced "the 
German form of fascism, 11 and admired the noble experiment of the Soviet Union. 
Christian circles were disturbed by the church struggle and the exile of promi-
nent Catholics like Austrian chancellor Schusschnigg at SL Louis University. 
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"The flight of the Muses" from Hitler's' storm-troopers (recently commemorated 
by the Smithsonian) brought several thousand of Weimar's most creative intellec-
tuals, artists and scholars to the New ~orld, whose influence powerfully affected 
American sciences, humanities and arts .. But the very struggle of men like the 
physicist Albert Einstein and the novelist Thomas Mann against the degradations 
of Nazism also testified to the possibility of another, more civilized Germany. 
Fascinated by the pomp and circumstance of National Socialist spectacles (like the 
1935 Nuremberg party rally on which Leni Riefenstahl 1 s film, The Triumph of the 
Will is based), ·talented newspaper and radio correspondents such as Dorothy 
Thompson, William L. Shirer and Howard K. Smith brilliantly reported and analyzed 
the fascist menace. In contrast to Franco-British appeasement, lranklin Dela~o 
Roosevelt, because of the instinctive antipathy of an anglophile patrician against 
the Bohemian upstart Hitler, ~ursue.d a generally anti-Nazi policy, supported 
· 1drg1::ly · by urban opinion-makers and East coast elites who themselves had been 
brought up in the Germanophobi,a of World War One. These influences and 11 the. 
strong visual impact of Hitler and his movement" in countless newsreels blurred 
and overshadowed all previous German images. But because of widespread isolationism 
public_ attitudes diverged drastically from published opinion. In a Decer.,ber 
1939 (Office of Public Opinion Research [Princeton]) poll, only 19.6% of Americans 
found "the Ge~~an p~ople have always had an irrepressible fondness for brute 
force and conquest, which makes a country a menace to world peace 11 while 66.6% 
still believed that they 11 are essentially peace-loving and kindly, but they 
have been unfortunate in being misled too often by ruthless and ambitious rulers. 11 
Hitler's declaration of war against the United States in December 1941, 
according to Yale historian Hans Gatzke 11 the greatest sfngle mis.take of his 
,, 
career,llmade,the worst smears of \·/orld War One propaganda a gruesome reality. 
Between 1942 and 1945 psychological, historical or economical potboilers onee 
again sought to strengthen fighting morale by arguing~ Germany Incurable, 
Germany: Jekyll and Hyde, The Thousand Year Conspiracy, The Hidden Enemy, 
Germany Will Try .!1 Again, and Germany Must Perish! Yet a 1942 poll found 
the Germans not only warlike (68%), cruel (59%), treacherous (43%), conceited 
(33%), arrogant (31%), .but also hard-working (62%), intelligent (41%), p~og~essive 
(31%), brave (30%) and practical (2.1%), indicating that animosity was largely 
superimposed upon earlier positive views. Although there was more objective 
reason to hate than in the 1910s, scholars strove for 11 a permanent and 
fundamental confrontation with the negative aspects of Germany" and ·cried 
to rise above propaganda. The most widespread intellectual explanations 
fastened upon the concept of national character From. Luth.er to Hitler (W. M. 
. -- -
McGovern, 1941), decried The Rise of Metapolitics from the Romantics to Hitler 
(P. Viereck, 1941) and sought The Roots of National Socialism (R. Butler, 1942) 
in Frederick the Great and Bismarck. When A. J. P. Taylor's essay commission~d 
for a British occupation handbook turned out 11 too depressing" and he was removed· 
from the project, he penned an even more vitriolic book on The Course of German 
History: "Nothing is no·rmal in German history except violent oscillations. 11 
Nevertheless the efforts of gifted historians and political ~cientists like 
Konrad Heiden, ·Franz Neumann, Carlton J. Hayes, William Langer and Raymond A. 
Sontag produced a sounder and more diversified understanding of the causes of 
German development than in 1917. Though the majority of men who made American 
politics belonged to the minority which hated Germans as such (2%), the majority 
of the public (58%) in September 1944 blamed Nazi leaders for the war while 
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38% considered both responsible .. The Germanophobes (20% in other surveys) 
succeded with the "unconditional surrender" formula in shutting the door on 
the German resistance (by robbing them of any prospect short of total defeat) 
and sponsored the notorious Morgenthau Plan for "pastoralizing" the defeated 
enemy, which was denounced by Secretary of ~-Jar Henry Stimson as "fighting 
brutality with brutality" and by Cordell Hull as "bl ind vengeance. 11 In many 
· ways "the real shock" came only after the end of the hostilities when the cumula-
tive effect of propaganda and pictures of concentration-camp survivors as well 
as of the machinery of death created an unspeakable revulsion \'lhich will forever 
darken the German image. In August 1945 only 19;5% thought "Germany .~tould really 
learn a lesson by this war and give up her ideas of ruling the world" while 
60% believed "she would just wait for a chance to try again." 
After initial hostility, the post-war period (1945-1960) reversed views. 
from evil enemy to valued ally and restored some of the older positive connota-
tions without eliminating the newer negative overtones. The punitive three· 
11 d1s 11 (denazification, demilitarization and dismantling of industry), demanded 
by the overwhelming majority ,of Americans and reinforced by the atrocities dis-
closed in the Nuremberg trials, achieved only some of their goals. The occupa-
tion policy (JCS directive 1067) ordering Gis "soldiers wise don't fraternize" 
soon broke down (this don 1 t mean me, buddy") not only because of the charms of· 
the Fr'auleins, but also because personally "the Kraut?" (as they were condes-
cendingly called by the troops) turned out not to be monsters, but regular 
people. Although in the beginning reporters like Curt Riess warned against 
werewolf resistance (The Nazis Go Underground), the "extent of German disin-
tegration and destruction" portrayed by more acute observers such as W. L. White 
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and Gustav Stolperproduced 11 a sense of sobering shock" and a feeling of respon-
sibility for feeding and housing the 10 million homeless refugees (philanthropically 
expressed in CARE packages). When the realization finally dawned among President 
Harry Truman's advisers that·Europe cou~d not recover without its industrial 
heart, U.S. policy shifted from emphasizing German "collective guilt" to recon-
struction in the Marshall Plan (1949) with America as economical 11 doctor, 11 
ideological 11 re-ed~cator, 11 political "partner" and touristic "discoverer." 
Creating the term 11 the brave, freedom-loving Berliners,11 the Soviet blockade 
of Berlin in 1948 was the turning point. "Just a few years before swastika-
bedecked Berlin had been the symbol of all we opposed, 11 Henry Cord Meyer 
remembered. 11 Now the Anglo-American airlift ceaselessly ferried in supplies 
for the besieged troops and citizens." Not only the global confrontati6n 
of the Cold War with the Soviet Union; but also the German choice of freedom 
· at the price of hunger and cold convinced the American public to support the 
creation of a Western Germany (the Federal Republic, founded in 1949 and granted 
full sovereignty and NATO membership in 1955). During the 1950s the "Economic 
f.1iracle 11 with about twice the gro\t1th rate of the U.S. became a great success 
story which restored American faith in free enterprise (so much so that it 
has figured prominently as argument for Rea90;1omics) and representative govern-
ment on the co~tinerit. Wizened Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's (affectionately 
called Der Alte, the old one) "conservative· democracyll was more liberal than 
. . 
any previous German government and cigar-smoking economics minister Ludwig 
Erhard's (known as 11 the rubber lion" because of his bulk)_ "social market· 
economy" proved more dynamic and welfare-oriented than most contemporaries had 
anticipated. Variously called "the bug" or. 11 the be~tle, 11 the unprepossessing 
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prewar designed Volkswagen became the symbol of postwdr German industry, relia-
bility and efficiency. Nevertheless this marriage· of political convenience, en-
couraged by Soviet tanks, retained an uneasy undertone, since American intellec-
tua 1 s like Wi 11 i am Shirer (The Rise and Fa 11 of the Thi rd Rei ch, '19€0) and t:Ji 11 i am ~1an-
ches ter (The Arms of~. 1968) tried to cash in on Nazi horrors while a genera-
tion of scholars sought to ponder the deeper meaning to The German Catastrophe 
(F. Meinecke, 1947). Hence V. S. Pritchett was not alone in warning that the 
Germans 11 have two faces •... The enigma of Germany is permanent." 
During the 1960s and 1970s the image of Germany has normalized but remained 
somewhat polarized and ambivalent. On the personal level millions of tourists 
take. their obligatory Rhine cruise or walk the cobbled streets of Rothenburg 
to discover 11 old Germany.'' Hundreds of .thousands of Gis still live in military 
islands (such as K-town for the German Kaiserslautern) which made "home in Ger-
many'' undoubtedly preferable to the jungles of 'Nam. Tens of. thousands of exchange 
students and scholars (supported by the German Academic Exchange Service or the 
Fulbright Program} study ''the German problem" first hand. Thousands of businessmen 
invest tn Germany or work with German U~S. subsidiaries like Siemens, Bayer or 
VW, proud of the slogan ''made in Germany" which initially meant cheap and durable 
and more recently expensive but high quality. In the political realm the smooth 
transition of power from the CDU (Christian-Conservative) to the SPD-FDP 
(Socialist-Liberal) government in 1969 demonstrated a degree of stability which 
allowed chancellor Helmut Schmidt to campaign in 1976 with the slogan of 11model 
nation Germany." His predecessor's Ostpolitik of detente towards the Soviet 
Union, the Eastern satellites and the German Democratic Republic dissipated much 
of the Slavic fear of 'German revanchism by recognizing postwar boundaries, as well as 
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renunciating force in reunifying the ,;Jo German states of one nation" as !Hlly 
I , . 
Brandt called them. Extraordinary prosperity due to union discipline 
I . 
aJlowed major wage increases for the woting masses and a high tax rate permitted 
the establishment of·a "network of social securities" rare in a capitalist economy. 
Visitors continue to marvel at the blen! of technologtcal modernity with instinc-
1 
. ! 
tive traditionalism evident in the renown of German science and industrial 
i 
dependability as well as in the Gem~tlihkeit of Bavarian customs (like the Okto-
. I . . 
berfest) or in the r·ame of star athletes (such as soccer's "Kaiser, 11 Franz 
Beckenbauer). But success has not displlled all shadows of the past since the 
holocaust television series and the con~inuing trials of war criminals revive 
old fears. The Radi::Jl.~nerl::tss, prohibiiting ·communists in the civil service 
- I 
I 
as well.as the terrorism of such "Hitler's Children" as Franz Baader and Ulrike 
Meinhof _raise painful totalit~rian memoiri~s. Material affluence has created 
· envy among former enemies and attempts ito preach ii 'German solution" to. stagflation 
touch off undercurrents of Germanophoby in vocal minorities. For writers such 
as Kathcrire Ann Porter (The Ship of Fools, 1962) psychological stereotypes of the 
I , 
chubby and sentimental Hausfrau (relegated to Kinder, K~che and Kirche), of the 
I 
authoritarian patriarch Of the 11 father-land 11 or of drilled an·d disciplined youth, 
I 
have the comfo~ting ring of familiarit1 which insures continuous sales. Hardly 
a season passes without a new potboilef with a swastika so that_ 1t seems not only 
to Russell Baker that "The Reich Goes 01•: In a series of 1966 government polls 
Germans were liked more by American me~ (64%) than by women (36%), whites (96%) 
. - . I 
than by blacks (4%), young (31%) than by old (22~~), educated (73%) than by less 
I . 
schooled (22%}, Protestants (70%) thanlby Catholics or Jews (24~~ and 2%), Republi-
cans (36%, but fewer in population) than by Democrats· (43%), Mid-Westerners (38%) 
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or Westerners (31%) than by North-Easterners (21%) or especially Southerners (13%). 
·. The negative Horld War Two traits have disappeared from the six most common adjec-
tives, such as hardworking, intelligent, progressive, practical, brave and honest, 
but rather form a counter-image with quick-tempered, warlike and arrogant following 
in the next places. Despite "special relationship" governmental rhetoric, these 
layers of historic images continue to create dissonances .. 
The transformation of the relations between the United States and the Federal 
Republic from dependence to 11 equivalence 11 (acc. to R .. Smyser) -in the last three 
decades emphasizes the importance of the German image for the psychological 
underpinni.ng.s of the Western alliance. Compared to successive Hitler-waves there 
is little continuous public interest in the present state of the Germanies. Since 
national images tend to lag c~nsiderably behind actual circumstances, the very 
"normality" of Central Europe means that information is often one decade out of 
date. The death of the emigre generation (Hann~h Arendt, 1975) is cutting the living 
bond between America and Germany, because the "founding fathers" of the Bonn 
Republic like Lucius D. Cl_ay (1978) have passed away and prosperity has dried up 
the last immigration streamlets,·such as.the 1960s 'brain drain.• Schools and 
colleges cannot make up the deficit. Dec-lining overall, German language teaching 
lingers in distant third place behind Spanish and French (but before Russian), and 
enrollments in Central E~ropean history or politics courses have fallen drasti-
cally, despite an impressive outpouring of sophisticated scholarship. Burgeoninn 
trade and investment, communality of values, constant middle level consultations 
and on-going exchange projects notwithstanding, this flagging of interest, which 
de-emotionalized the German image (with only 2% hostile and 40% undecided in a 




contrast to the Eastern German Democratic Republic (GDR), which as Soviet 
teacher's pet, makes little effort emerge out of the shadow of its big brother, formal 
ties between Bonn and Washington are quite close, indeed sometime~ too close for 
comfort. But increasing West German power and assertiveness in a 11 semi-Gaullist 
Europe 11 (Fritz Stern in Foreign Affairs) coupled with decreastng understanding 
for its views (due to outdated information) is likely to cause greater conflicts 
over detente (attitudes towards the Soviet Union), defense (European nuclear 
rearmament) or economic policy (high interest rates, dollar course) in the 1980s. 
While superficially the country is more familiar to Americans than ever 
before, older' fears are beginning to mingle with new suspicions. WorldrWar 
Two stereotypes are clashing more and more with recent television news images 
which seem disturbing but for different reasons. There is little appreciation 
in the U'.S. of the extent of which German society is fundamentally different from 
the 1950s, when it was the star-pupil of the West. Hence it must come as a shock 
to read John Vinocour 1 s dissection of "The German i,talaise 11 in the New York Times ---
Magazine (November 15, 1981). This time it is the economic recession and the 
peace movement of the Left ( 11 we want no Euroshima! 11 ) which have created a "sense 
of trouble, of dissatisfaction, of fatigue," a "vacuum of frustration and anger" 
which is threatening the prosperous and reliable self-image of the recent past. 
Given the widespread lack of information, it is difficult to understand the sources 
·of the current leftist anti-Americanism and lingering hopes for unification. The 
accuracy and reliability of images is therefore not only an academic issue without 
real life consequences. One country's views of another are of crucial importance, 
because they time and again profoundly affect policies and decisions. Hence 
attempts to polish up the German image by well-meaning groups or individuals are 
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as dangerous as efforts to keep it tarnished, lest we forget the horrors of the 
past. What is needed above all is a more sustained and sophisticated American .. 
interest in the outside world, focussed on those countries which, like the 
Federal Republic, are of primary importance to US national interest, whether 
itbe economic, military or political (not to mention the cultural and personal 
dimensio~. A more up-to-date and accurate understanding of German economic 
strergth, increasing political power, and continuing social tension will not 
eliminate the disputes between Bonn and Washington, but it will make bargaining 
more responsible and successful. In many ways, misperceptions, based on many-· 
layered views of past, are more dangerous than honest disagreements. And the 
consequences of misunderstanding are always worst among friends. 
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